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THE IDENTITIES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. AND EU 
REVOLUTIONS 
ALEX MILLS* 
This article, first presented as part of a conference entitled “What is 
private international law?”, responds to this question through analysis of 
four different “identities” through which private international law has 
been viewed. It begins by exploring two contrasting classical approaches, 
under which private international law is concerned with the international 
ordering of state power, or with the national recognition of private rights. 
It then turns to examine the US and EU private international law 
“revolutions,” and the very different further identities of private 
international law which have emerged as a consequence of each. After 
reflecting critically on the experiences of these revolutions, the article 
offers some concluding thoughts as to how the identity or identities of 
private international law can or should be constructed, arguing that there 
are valuable lessons and potentially propitious elements in each of the four 
examined identities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question “what is private international law” – raised by the title of 
the conference at which this article was first presented – could be 
approached in a number of different ways. It might, for instance, invoke 
consideration of what we decide to include within the subject, and what we 
determine falls beyond its periphery;1 an increasingly difficult question in 
the European Union as non-traditional regulatory mechanisms at least 
functionally comparable to private international law rules have been 
developed.2 It might similarly raise questions concerning whether private 
international law should be viewed as a “subject” – a set of rules dealing 
with cross-border private law relations – or as a “technique” for managing 
the boundaries of normative systems which could potentially be brought to 
bear on a range of other, perhaps analogous, problems.3 But there is also a 
deeper challenge posed by the question, which is almost existential in 
character – it asks what is the identity and purpose of private international 
law; what is it for, what does it do? To ask these questions is really to ask 
two different things. First, how does private international law see itself; 
what is its “self-image,” representing its goals, ideals or aspirations? 
Second, how does private international law look from the outside; what are 
its “objective” characteristics, products, or effects? The reason it is 
important to distinguish these two questions – which we might also call the 
questions of the identities of private international law in theory and in 
practice – is that the answers in each case may well be different, and this 
may give rise to something of an “identity crisis,” as through the force of 
the pressures created by this discrepancy private international law (in 
theory and/or practice) undergoes a revolutionary transformation. 
The focus of this article is on two traditional ideas of private 
 
 1.  For the purposes of this article, private international law is understood to include rules on 
jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Each of these 
aspects of private international law has been transformed as part of the EU revolution; the analysis in 
this article will be principally but not exclusively focused on choice of law, as it is the part of private 
international law most affected by the U.S. private international law revolution. 
 2. For example, the “country of origin” principle. See generally ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE 
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 200 (2009); Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice 
of Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607, 1625 (2008); Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Private International 
Law? Reconceptualising the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L 
L. 195 (2006); Geert De Baere, “Is this a conflict rule which I see before me?” Looking for a Hidden 
Conflict Rule in the Principle of Origin as Implemented in Primary European Community Law and in 
the “Directive on Electronic Commerce,” 11 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 287 (2004). 
 3. See, e.g., Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to Technique: 
Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (2012); Ralf Michaels and 
Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of 
Public International Law, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349 (2012). 
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international law, as well as two such “revolutions” in private international 
law thinking – what they reacted against, how and why, and what we may 
learn from each.4 The first is the U.S. revolution which was sparked by the 
work of scholars such as Cavers5 and Currie6 in the middle of the twentieth 
century, although in many ways it is still on-going or at least has thus far 
proved inconclusive.7 The second is the EU revolution which was initiated 
with the Brussels Convention of 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters,8 but which has accelerated 
over the last decade or so. To describe these as revolutions is to highlight 
that in each case, private international law undertook something of an 
identity transformation. These phases of development were periods in 
which in which the basic conceptions of the purposes of private 
international law were shifted in a fundamental way, rather than periods in 
which the details or techniques of private international law rules have been 
reworked based on established foundations (as in, for example, the 
evolutionary EU “upgrades” from the Brussels Convention to the Brussels I 
Regulation,9 and from the Rome Convention on Choice of Law in 
Contractual Obligations10 to its successor the Rome I Regulation11). To 
borrow an expression from the philosophy of science, these are times in 
which private international law underwent a paradigm shift.12 
The premise of this article is that our understanding of the identities of 
private international law may profit from a closer examination of the 
experiences of both the U.S. and EU revolutions. The U.S. revolution 
rightfully rejected the artifice of vested rights which had become 
foundational to common law private international law in favor of policy-
 
 4. This article aims to contribute to a growing literature considering and comparing 
developments in the EU and United States, perhaps most notably Ralf Michaels, The New European 
Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607 (2008). 
 5. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 7. See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2006). 
 8. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (consolidated version), 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1, 3. 
 9. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1. 
 10. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (consolidated version), 1998 
O.J. (C 27) 34, 36. 
 11. Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6. 
 12. See Thomas S. Kuhn, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); see 
Michaels, supra note 2, at 1610; but see Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Revolution and the 
European Evolution in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1741 (2008). 
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oriented approaches, but (it is argued) went too far in its wholesale 
adoption of a destructive and fragmenting anti-formalist critique inspired 
by American legal realism. The EU revolution has, by contrast, largely 
successfully revived traditional ideas of private international law within a 
new federal context, but (it is argued) with a commitment to formalism and 
narrowly defined objectives that carries its own unsatisfactory 
consequences, including the obscuring of policy decisions and 
consequences and the adoption of overly rigid rules precluding decisional 
sensitivity to facts. There are lessons to be learned in both the contrasting 
and shared experiences of these two revolutions, as well as from the 
traditions they rejected. 
I. THE OBJECTIVES OF “CLASSICAL” PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
This section outlines two historical understandings of private 
international law, which both put the later U.S. and EU experiences in 
context, and to some extent have also informed their development. The 
views are presented as strongly contrasting and even contradictory to 
highlight their polarity, which is not to say that intermediate or hybrid 
positions cannot be or have not been adopted. 
A. International ordering of state power 
The first perspective is that private international law is concerned with 
state power. The clearest historical articulation of this approach was 
provided by Savigny in the early part of the nineteenth century. He 
identified private international law rules as responsive to the problem of 
coexisting sovereign states and their legal orders. In his own (translated) 
words: 
 
It is the function of the rules of law to govern legal relations. But what is 
the extent or sphere of their authority? What legal relations (cases) are 
brought under their control?13 
Which of the different local laws with which the legal relation in dispute 
in any way comes in contact, is to be applied in the decision of the 
question?14 
 
Presented in this way, the essential function of private international 
 
 13. Friedrich Carl Von Savigny, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 5 (William Guthrie trans., T. & T., Law Publishers 1869). 
 14. Id. at 17-18. 
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law is the allocation of regulatory authority between states. The function of 
Savigny’s study of private international law was therefore declared to be: 
To discover for every legal relation (case) that legal territory to which, in 
its proper nature, it belongs or is subject (in which it has its seat).15 
Savigny thus thought that each legal relation had a “natural” seat 
(according to “its proper nature”) – but such dependence on an “intuited” 
natural law framework was already suspect in the nineteenth century, and 
few would find it convincing today.16 Later scholars and law-makers 
working in this classical tradition have generally focused on developing 
and evaluating further secondary criteria or objectives which might justify 
a particular choice of law rule – the identification of the most appropriate 
“connecting factor” (or factors) for each type of dispute.17 They have thus 
focused on the way in which private international law should serve this 
function – the principles according to which the regulatory authority of 
states ought to be determined, or through which legal relationships should 
be “localized.”18 These have traditionally included reliance on both 
personal and territorial connections (recognizing community-based or 
territory-based power or affiliation), as well as considerations of balancing 
fairness to claimants and respondents, and balancing predictability and the 
benefits of legal certainty against a flexibility which might lead to more 
appropriate results in particular cases.19 This allocation of regulatory 
authority is also carried out within a framework of public international law 
rules which define the permitted grounds on which a state may assert 
“jurisdiction” (as understood in public international law) – although this 
public international dimension of private international law has not 
 
 15. Id. at 89. 
 16. But see Perry Dane, The Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, in D.E. CHILDRESS III, 
THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
 17. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 18. “Whether, for example, the legal effect of a given transaction ought to be tested by the lex 
actus, the lex domicilii, or the lex fori, is a matter admitting of discussion, which ought to be discussed, 
on intelligible grounds of principle.” – Albert Venn Dicey, On Private International Law as a Branch 
of the Law of England, 6 L. QUARTERLY REV. 1, 17 (1890). 
 19. See, e.g., Catherine Kessedjian, Edward Ho, and Jacob van de Velden, International Civil 
Litigation and the Interests of the Public, Report of the International Law Association, Sofia 
Conference (2012) (noting the need for “rules which strike a fair balance between, on the one-hand, the 
importance of safeguarding the legitimate interests of Defendants and, on the other, ensuring that no 
injury is left without redress”), http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/D7AFA4C8-E599-40FE-
B6918B239B949698; Symeon C. Symeonides, Codification and Flexibility in Private International 
Law, in GENERAL REPORTS OF THE XVIIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (K.B. Brown & D.V. Snyder eds., 2012); Mills, supra note 2, at 236; Peter Hay, 
Flexibility Versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law: Reflections on Current European 
and United States Conflicts Law, 226 RECUEIL DES COURS 281 (1991); see infra note 67 and 
accompanying text. 
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infrequently been obscured.20 
Perhaps the most important secondary objective guiding the allocation 
of regulatory authority of states under this perspective is the avoidance of a 
conflict of legal orders. The three traditionally identified components of 
private international law may each be viewed in this light as strategies to 
minimize a possible conflict of laws – by reducing the situations in which 
more than one state might assert jurisdiction, by attempting to ensure that 
even if more than one state has jurisdiction they will each apply the same 
substantive law,21 and by providing that a judgment obtained in one state is 
at least presumptively considered determinative in other states, precluding 
re-litigation. This emphasis on avoiding regulatory conflicts is both a 
reflection of the interests of private parties who may suffer under 
contradictory rules, as well as a recognition that such international ordering 
is a strongly desirable feature of a lawful international community of states, 
since in a principally horizontal international order such conflicts may 
typically be resolvable, if at all, only through extra-legal exercises of 
power. 
B. National recognition of private rights 
An opposing and contrasting perspective on private international law 
is that the subject is not concerned with state power but with private rights. 
This approach had its origins in the Dutch private international law school 
of the seventeenth century,22 and later influenced (in turn) Joseph Story23 
(in the United States), Albert Venn Dicey24 (in the United Kingdom), and 
Joseph Henry Beale25 (in the United States), who would author the First 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) for the American Law Institute. 
Beale’s first published work on private international law was in fact an 
1896 book review of Dicey’s “A Digest of the Law of England with 
 
 20. See generally MILLS, supra note 2; Alex Mills, Normative Individualism and Jurisdiction in 
Public and Private International Law: Toward a “Cosmopolitan Sovereignty”? (CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L 
COMP. L. CONF., Working Paper May 1, 2012) [hereinafter Mills, Normative Individualism], available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2055295. 
 21. In Savigny’s words, “in cases of conflict of laws, the same legal relations (cases) have to 
expect the same decision, whether the judgment be pronounced in this state or in that.” Savigny, supra 
note 13, at 27. 
 22. Ulrich Huber, ‘De Conflictu Legum’ (1684) reprinted in Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s de 
Conflictu Legum 13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 401-18 (1919). 
 23. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834). 
 24. See generally ALBERT VENN DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE 
TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1896) [hereinafter DICEY, DIGEST]. 
 25. See generally JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) [hereinafter 
BEALE, TREATISE (1935)]. 
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Reference to the Conflict of Laws,” published that same year.26 In that 
review, Beale cited approvingly Dicey’s formulation of a private rights 
based approach to the subject: 
 
[T]he rules of so-called private international law are based on the 
recognition of actually acquired rights, i.e. of rights which when 
acquired could be really enforced by the sovereign of the State where 
they have their origin.27 
 
The foundations of this approach lay in the equality of sovereign states 
and their exclusive sovereignty over territory, which were taken to imply 
that acts within a territory “vested” rights in private parties, which ought 
then to be recognized by foreign legal systems – necessitating rigid 
territorial choice of law rules.28 This “ought,” however, was not a legal 
imperative, as no sovereign could be commanded to do anything,29 and thus 
the sense of obligation to recognize foreign rights arose, purely as part of 
domestic law, from the need to do justice between the parties. From this 
perspective, Dicey had earlier argued (with parts again cited approvingly 
by Beale in his book review): 
 
The application of foreign law is not a matter of caprice or option. It 
does not arise from the desire of the sovereign of England, or of any 
other sovereign, to show courtesy to other States. It flows from the 
impossibility of otherwise determining whole classes of cases without 
 
 26. 10 HARV. L. REV. 168, 168 (1896) [hereinafter Beale, Book Review]. Dicey’s continuing 
influence on Beale might also be attributed to the fact that Dicey was a visiting lecturer at Harvard 
University Law School in 1898, where Beale was appointed a Professor in 1897 (after serving as an 
Assistant Professor since 1892), although Beale had lectured on Conflict of Laws since the 1893-94 
academic year. See Erwin N. Griswold, Mr. Beale and the Conflict of Laws 56 HARV. L. REV. 690, 690-
91 (1943). Beale’s first major work on conflict of laws was a multi-volume casebook (Selection of 
Cases on the Conflict of Laws) completed in 1902.  Id. 
 27. Albert Venn Dicey, Book Review, 1 L. Q. REV. 246, 248(1885) (reviewing FRANCIS T. 
PIGGOTT, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM RELATING TO FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS AND PARTIES OUT OF THE JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1884)) [hereinafter Dicey, Book Review], 
cited with approval in Beale, Book Review, supra note 26, at 168. 
 28. Thus, “a contract gives rise to legal obligations, because in the place where the act of contract 
takes place a legal obligation is created by that act. When two men shake hands in Boston, the law of 
England is incapable of attaching any legal consequence to their act. There is no law of England where 
the act is done. The law of Massachusetts is there, ready, if it chooses, to give the act legal significance. 
If it does not choose, the act is incapable of having a legal significance. No right, in other words, can 
spring up on the soil of Massachusetts, unless it is created by the laws of Massachusetts.”  Beale, Book 
Review, supra note 26, at 170. 
 29. Thus, Dicey argued (following Austin) that “The principles of international law, properly so 
called. . . are not in the proper sense of the term ‘laws’, for they are not commands proceeding from any 
sovereign.” DICEY, DIGEST, supra note 24, at 14. 
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gross inconvenience and injustice to litigants, whether natives or 
foreigners. . . . [T]he courts, e.g. of England, never in strictness enforce 
foreign law; when they are said to do so, they enforce not foreign laws, 
but rights acquired under foreign laws.30 
 
The one point of criticism which Beale made in his review of Dicey’s 
book was to query whether Dicey had himself been consistent with this 
underlying principle, in accepting a role for party autonomy in the law 
applicable to contracts. In Beale’s view, this was contrary to the 
sovereignty of states, as “parties cannot by their own will change the law of 
the country in which they are”31 – an apparent conundrum which has 
proved stubbornly elusive in private international law theory.32 Thus he 
argued that a contract should exclusively be governed by the law of the 
place of contracting, with only a secondary role, aiding in interpretation of 
the contract, played by the law which the parties intended to govern their 
relationship.33 This highlights that, although scholars like Beale and Dicey 
characterized private international law as concerned with private rights, 
they also derived the existence of those rights from a particular view of 
state power – focusing on the exclusive territorial sovereignty of each state. 
This, however, implied a major difference in the approach of these scholars 
when compared to Savigny – for them, private international law was 
strictly a matter of national law, and not a question of ordering derived 
from the existence of an international community of states. These two 
perspectives on private international law may, therefore, be fairly described 
as competing “paradigms” – approaches or perspectives whose 
incompatible foundational principles render them incommensurable.34 It is 
for this reason that Savigny could simply dismiss vested rights as “a 
complete circle; for we can only know what are vested rights, if we know 
beforehand by what local law we are to decide as to their complete 
acquisition”35 – but equally that such criticism would be entirely 
unpersuasive to later figures such as Dicey and Beale. As Thomas Kuhn 
 
 30. Id. at 10. 
 31. Beale, Book Review, supra note 26, at 170. 
 32. See, e.g., Mills, Normative Individualism, supra note 20. 
 33. Such a distinction between the “governing law” and the “law regulating interpretation” is not 
unknown to the modern common law – it is similar to the position which is still applied in relation to 
the law governing a will. The system of law governing the material validity of a will is determined to be 
the law of the place of domicile of the deceased at the time of death, but the interpretation of the will is 
regulated by the law which has been chosen or was intended by the deceased. See Dellar v. Zivy, [2007] 
EWHC (Ch.) 2266 [21]-[23] (Eng.). 
 34. See Kuhn, supra note 12, at 150; Michaels, supra note 2, at 1610. 
 35. Savigny, supra note 13, at102-03. 
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described it in introducing the concept of paradigms to the philosophy of 
science: 
 
[T]he proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in 
different worlds. . . .Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of 
scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the 
same direction. . . . That is why a law that cannot even be demonstrated 
to one group of scientists may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to 
another.36 
II. THE U.S. CHOICE OF LAW REVOLUTION 
In the early part of the twentieth century, Beale’s vested rights 
approach dominated thinking about private international law in the United 
States – perhaps at least in part because “When he started to teach, his was 
apparently the only course on Conflict of Laws given in any law school in 
the country”.37 His approach was understood to require rigid territorial 
choice of law rules, developed as part of federal law (and under the 
influence of the Full Faith and Credit38 and Due Process39 clauses of the 
U.S. Constitution), as a necessary consequence of the need to protect 
vested rights. In 1926, it was suggested that the “Supreme Court has quite 
definitely committed itself to a program of making itself, to some extent, a 
tribunal for bringing about uniformity in the field of conflicts,”40 on the 
basis that “the full faith and credit clause . . . impose[s] on a state court the 
duty, in framing its local rule, to follow the statute of another state where, 
in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the demands of justice require that 
such a course be adopted.”41 
But as Beale’s work culminated in the First Restatement on Conflict 
 
 36. Kuhn, supra note 12, at 150. 
 37. Griswold, supra note 26, at 690. 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe 
the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”). Key 
cases included Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912), New York Life Insurance Company v. 
Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914), New York Life Insurance Company v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918), 
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925), and Bradford Electric Light Company v. 
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). 
 39. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). There are two components to ‘due 
process’: Amendment V, “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law” (affecting federal authorities, ratified in 1791); and Amendment XIV, § 1, “nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (affecting the 
States, ratified in 1868). 
 40. E. Merrick Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of 
Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REV. 533, 560 (1926). 
 41. Id. at 544. 
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of Laws, published in 1934, it came under major challenge, principally as a 
result of the rise of American legal realism.42 Broadly put, American legal 
realism was a reaction against a mechanical and formalistic approach to 
jurisprudence, under which the application of law was (or aspired to be) a 
quasi-scientific rational process. Legal realists argued instead that the 
application of law was inherently indeterminate and necessarily involved 
policy choices, with legal rules serving as rationalizations rather than 
justifications for those choices.43 Methodologically, these critics shared 
with Dicey an emphasis on the study of law as an empirical phenomenon, 
with rules derived from case law representing the real practice of judges – 
that theory should, therefore, follow from practice, and not the other way 
round. As Walter Wheeler Cook put it: 
 
In the present discussion it is proposed, instead of following the a priori 
method, to adopt the procedure which has proved so fruitful in other 
fields of science, viz. to observe concrete phenomena first and to form 
generalizations afterwards. We shall therefore undertake to formulate 
general statements as to what the “law” of a given country “can” or 
“cannot” do in the way of attaching legal consequences to situations and 
transactions by observing what has actually been done. In making our 
observations we shall, however, find it necessary to focus our attention 
upon what courts have done, rather than upon the description they have 
given of the reasons for their action. Whatever generalizations we reach 
will therefore purport to be nothing more than an attempt to describe in 
as simple a way as possible the concrete judicial phenomena observed, 
and their “validity” will be measured by their effectiveness in 
accomplishing that purpose.44 
 
Taking this empirical methodology further, other legal realists argued 
that there was, indeed, nothing more to law than such “concrete judicial 
 
 42. See generally, e.g., Bruce Wardhaugh, From Natural Law to Legal Realism: Legal 
Philosophy, Legal Theory, and the Development of American Conflict of Laws since 1830, 41 ME. L. 
REV. 307 (1989). 
 43. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1897) 
(“Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing 
legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and 
nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form.”); L.L. Fuller, American 
Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 435 (1934)  (“The traditional conception of legal method 
imposes a . . . hypocrisy  on the modern judge. Often his procedure is to decide the case first on the 
basis of ‘non-technical’ considerations. Then armed . . . with . . . fictions, analogies, [and] ‘theories’, he 
proceeds to wring from his code or other body of doctrine the legally acceptable basis for his 
decision.”); see also infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 44. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 
457, 460 (1924); see also Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 
YALE L. J. 736 (1924). 
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phenomena observed.” In the famous words of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 
“prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law”,45 and thus “a legal duty so called 
is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will 
be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; and so of a 
legal right.”46 Somewhat ironically, as a Justice of the Supreme Court 
Holmes provided one of the most influential endorsements of the vested 
rights approach in holding (in respect of a claim arising out of an accident 
in Mexico, but sued on in Texas) that: 
 
The theory of the foreign suit is that, although the act complained of was 
subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, 
an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may 
be enforced wherever the person may be found. . . . But as the only 
source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that 
that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation . . . but 
equally determines its extent.47 
 
As a legal theorist, however, Holmes’ realist skepticism helped sow 
the seeds for the US choice of law revolution against this approach. 
For private international law, and choice of law in particular,48 the 
legal realist perspective gave rise to an entirely different critique of vested 
rights than that offered by Savigny – an external view of the identity of 
private international law, which initiated the U.S. choice of law 
revolution’s paradigm shift. If rights are not recognized by courts, but 
rather created by them through judicial acts, then the idea that choice of 
 
 45. Holmes, supra note 43, at 460-1. 
 46. Id. at 458. 
 47. Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (footnotes omitted). 
Holmes remained committed to this position at least as late as 1924, where in a letter to the English 
legal scholar Sir Frederick Pollock he reaffirmed the strictness of his adherence to the vested rights 
approach, even suggesting that “Dicey went further than I should in emphasizing local policy”, adding 
“We used to fight about it. I mean Dicey and I.” See HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS – THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES & SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932 (Peabody 
Museum) (Harvard University Press, 1961), p.138 (letter dated 11 June 1924). 
 48. This section focuses on choice of law, as it is in this field that the major theoretical challenges 
have arisen in respect of private international law in the United States. A comparable analysis of rules 
on jurisdiction in the United States might also be attempted – noting, for instance, the abandonment of 
traditional territorial jurisdictional rules in favor of more open-textured ‘fairness-based’ approaches, 
such as California’s rule that “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not 
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States” (California Code of Civil 
Procedure, s.410.10), which limits jurisdiction only according to Due Process minimum contacts 
requirements. These requirements appear, however, to have been recently tightened in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011). 
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law involves the recognition of foreign vested rights is not circular but 
rather a meaningless legal fiction. Under this approach, rights do not in fact 
exist until the local court decides whether or not to “enforce” them – a 
decision which is not determined by legal doctrine but by judicial policy 
and preference. Cook illustrated this problem by considering complex 
foreign cross-border torts, such as where the wrongful act, the direct injury, 
and the ultimate loss were suffered in different places. Since (according to 
his analysis) more than one state might rightfully claim to regulate the 
consequences of the act, under which law should it be decided whether a 
right has vested. “Obviously”, concluded Cook, “we can no longer turn the 
crank of the logical machine and produce the answer ready-made, for no 
single state has exclusive jurisdiction; there is no single foreign right to 
recognize and enforce.”49 For Cook, this posed an unanswerable question 
for the vested rights approach: “If [a court] nevertheless gives the plaintiffs 
a judgment, can we accurately describe that action otherwise than by 
saying that the right so enforced is a right created by the law of [the court] 
and not a foreign-created right?”50 Under this perspective, the right 
enforced is really local in its foundation (thus Cook is sometimes described 
as having developed the ‘local law’ theory),51 and its enforcement cannot 
be explained or justified by a theory of vested rights. On this basis, Cook 
highlighted the inconsistency between Holmes’ theoretical work and his 
Supreme Court judgment cited above, arguing that: 
 
The decision thus appears not as an inevitable outcome from fixed 
premises (that the forum is enforcing an obligatio created by foreign law, 
 
 49. Cook, supra note 43, at 468; see similarly Lorenzen, supra note 44. This analysis reflected 
both a practical reality of asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction, as well as the increased legal acceptance 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction as part of U.S. law (see id. at 482-85), as well as under both public and 
private international law. See generally, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of 
American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW &CONTEMP.  PROBS. 11 
(1987); Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public 
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280 (1982).  In public international law, the general 
permissibility of extraterritorial regulation was controversially endorsed by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in  SS “Lotus” (France v. Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Ser A, No 10 , which held (at 
pp.18-19) that international law is “Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States 
may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property or 
acts outside their territory”, but rather “leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is 
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to 
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”  Id. at 19; see also Mills, supra note 20. 
 50. Id. at 469. 
 51. The judgments of Justice Learned Hand were influential here. For example, in Guinness v. 
Miller (1923), 291 F 769, he had held  that “no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign, 
and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an 
obligation recognized by that sovereign.” Id. at 770. 
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and must inevitably take it or leave it, just as it is), but for what it is, and 
for what Mr. Justice Holmes undoubtedly knew it was – a practical result 
based upon the reasons of policy established in prior cases.52 
 
The need for reliance on prior cases was an important aspect of 
Cook’s approach – he was not arguing that all judging is indeterminate, but 
accepting that a decision may be guided by similar precedents which 
establish relevant policies. In cases where analogies might be drawn with 
more than one precedent – where more than one “rule” might govern – the 
choice between analogies or precedents would itself be a policy decision 
for the judge. He argued that this phenomenon had arisen more often in 
conflict of laws, because of the relative scarcity of precedents, suggesting 
that: 
 
[A] writer attempting to set forth the “American law” upon the conflict 
of laws is necessarily compelled more often than in any other field to 
choose between conflicting rules. In making a choice between such rules, 
it is obvious that here as elsewhere the basis must be a pragmatic one of 
the effect of a decision one way or the other in giving a practical working 
rule.53 
 
Although Cook set the stage for the realist revolution by focusing 
attention on the policy analysis inherent in deciding choice of law cases, 
other scholars such as David F. Cavers carried the analysis further, arguing 
that a more fundamental indeterminacy in legal decision-making displaced 
the supposed certainty provided by precedent. In part, this was reflective of 
a broader and more general philosophical critique of linguistic 
determinacy, and in part it was a critique focused on the particular 
characteristics (or perceived characteristics) of choice of law rules – the 
availability of a variety of flexible exceptions, including characterization, 
public policy, renvoi, and the substance-procedure distinction. Cavers thus 
argued that existing choice of law rules were fundamentally flawed because 
they failed to provide an accurate predictive device for judicial behavior – 
to put this another way, there was a disconnect between the theory and 
practice of private international law. Instead of a deterministic rule-based 
analysis, judges were in fact making policy decisions based to some extent 
on precedent but also significantly on their own evaluation of competing 
policy interests.54 
 
 52. Id. at 480. 
 53. Id. at 488. 
 54. See generally, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. 
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Dual and opposing – almost contradictory – criticisms were therefore 
raised. On the one hand, the rigid rules favored by the vested rights 
approach often led to inappropriate results because the rules were 
insufficiently attentive to policy considerations, and (since vested rights 
viewed choice of law through the lens of state power) took insufficient 
account of the expectations of private parties – as noted above, there was 
for instance no room for party autonomy in Beale’s First Restatement, 
despite practice and precedent to the contrary. On the other hand, such rigid 
rules were often evaded through escape devices, which enabled judges to 
circumvent the ‘undesirable’ consequences of their application. To adopt 
the words of one prominent scholar, Brainerd Currie: 
 
A sensitive and ingenious court can detect an absurd result and avoid it; I 
am inclined to think that this has been done more often than not and that 
therein lies a major reason why the system has managed to survive. At 
the same time, we constantly run the risk that the court may lack 
sensitivity and ingenuity; we are handicapped in even presenting the 
issue in its true light; and instances of mechanical application of the rules 
to produce indefensible results are by no means rare. Whichever of these 
phenomena is the more common, it is a poor defense of the system to say 
that the unacceptable results that it will inevitably produce can be 
averted by disingenuousness if the courts are sufficiently alert.55 
 
For such critics, then, the only choice of law rule which would 
adequately describe and predict (and liberate) judicial decision making 
would be an open-textured rule which expressly invited judges to carry out 
an analysis of competing policy interests56 – in full awareness and 
cognizance of the content of potentially applicable substantive laws (a 
consideration strikingly absent in the traditional approaches examined 
above, under which conflict of laws rules are blind to the content of the 
potentially applicable laws).57 This required a reorientation of private 
international law, away from the traditional objective of “conflicts” justice, 
 
REV. 173 (1933); see DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965). 
 55. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 181 (1963). 
 56. This approach was at least partially inspired by the Supreme Court decision in Alaska Packers 
Ass’n v. Industrial Accidents Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), in which the Court had 
held that choice of law disputes should be resolved “not by giving automatic effect to the Full Faith and 
Credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the other, 
but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision 
according to their weight.” Id. at 547. This “interest-balancing” approach to the Due Process clause was 
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 
(1981). 
 57. See, e.g., Cavers, supra note 54, at 180ff. 
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toward the same values of “material” or “substantive” justice which 
motivate private law.58 
There are of course a wide and diverse range of different approaches 
and techniques which were introduced as part of the U.S. conflict of laws 
revolution – perhaps as many techniques as scholars, if not more. Not all of 
these invite the courts to evaluate the potential substantive outcomes of a 
choice of potentially applicable laws themselves. We might again highlight, 
for instance, the work of Currie, who argued that an analysis of government 
interests would frequently reveal a “false conflict,” under which only one 
state was genuinely interesting in regulating the disputed relationship. 
Where a true conflict did exist, he argued that the forum ought to resolve it 
in favor of its own law – a consequence which flowed from the fact that the 
court would be evaluating domestic against foreign policies, and was in no 
position to decide that the foreign policy was superior to that of their own 
legislature.59 
It is characteristic of Currie’s approach that the analysis of the 
“interests” of each state should be conducted at least principally through 
interpretation of the potentially applicable statutes. It thus involves the 
determination of whether a state has subjectively asserted an interest, rather 
than an objective determination of which state has the ‘greater’ or ‘more 
genuine’ interest.60 It should be noted that at times Currie did stretch the 
boundaries of interpretation toward more objective considerations, 
suggesting for example that it might involve asking “whether the relation of 
the forum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the 
assertion of an interest in the application of that policy”61 (although he did 
not develop in depth criteria for determining this question of legitimacy62). 
Nevertheless, his method in general attempts to detect a literal ‘conflict of 
laws’, rather than resolve a potential conflict of regulatory authority. Under 
this approach, an assertion of regulatory authority – local or foreign – can 
never be invalid, although foreign assertions may be trumped by an 
 
 58. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (1993); Symeon 
C. Symeonides, Material Justice and Conflicts Justice in Choice of Law, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER (Borchers & 
Zekoll eds., 2001), 
 59. Currie, supra note 55, at 181, arguing that “assessment of the respective values of the 
competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a 
political function of a very high order. This is a function that should not be committed to courts in a 
democracy.” 
 60. See Mills, supra note 2, at 259ff. 
 61. See Currie (1963), supra note 55, at 183 (emphasis added). 
 62. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM J.  COMP. L. 
1, 9 (1984). 
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overlapping claim by the forum state. 
The choice of law revolution in the United States was further 
facilitated by the decision of the Supreme Court to back down from its 
previous program of establishing federal choice of law rules.63 In Klaxon v 
Stentor Electric (1941), the Court determined instead that federal courts 
exercising diversity jurisdiction are obliged to apply the choice of law rules 
of the states within which they are sitting – effectively, that choice of law 
rules fell within state and not federal regulatory authority.64 Although 
subsequently the Court has continued to recognize some constitutional 
limits on state choice of law rules, requiring ‘significant contacts’ to justify 
the application of a state’s own law,65 the effect of this decision was to shift 
almost entirely the choice of law debate from the federal level to the 
diverse states. This opened US choice of law to the process of legal 
experimentation which has characterized it since. At the same time, 
however, it largely undermined the collective goals which had been an 
inherent part of the perspective which had previously been adopted on 
choice of law. Left to each state, it was impossible for choice of law rules 
to aspire to the universalism of Savigny’s objective system of allocation of 
private law regulatory authority. This in turn transferred attention to the 
content of choice of law rules, now viewed as policy decisions for each 
individual state. The focus of analysis thus shifted from issues of ordering 
or conflict avoidance to questions of justice, fairness, or appropriateness for 
the resolution of the particular conflict at hand. This in turn reinforced the 
work of theorists who had argued that choice of law rules should be open-
textured and allow judges to evaluate competing interests, particularly 
legislative objectives, in determining the governing law. 
While a Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws was produced in 
1969, it has been criticized for incoherently combining a variety of 
theoretical approaches rather than bringing clarity. In reference to a claim 
in contract, for example, under the Second Restatement the courts should 
follow an express or implied choice of law by the parties,66 unless there is 
no substantial relationship with the parties or the dispute and there is no 
other reasonable basis for the choice, and subject to the rule that the parties 
cannot contract contrary to a “fundamental policy of a State which has a 
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the 
 
 63. See Alex Mills, Federalism in the European Union and the United States: Subsidiarity, 
Private Law and the Conflict of Laws, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 369, 408-21 (2010). 
 64. 313 U.S. 487, 494-98 (1941). 
 65. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Philips Petroleum Company v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Sun Oil Company v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1969). 
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particular issue.”67 If no choice of law is made by the parties, flexible 
choice of law rules apply, for example, selecting the law of the State with 
the “most significant relationship” to the contract.68 The Second 
Restatement lists a series of relevant principles to be considered in 
determining which State has the most significant relationship, which 
include “the needs of the interstate and international systems,” “the relevant 
policies of the forum,” “the relevant policies of other interested states,” 
“the protection of justified expectations,” and “certainty, predictability and 
uniformity of results.”69 Additional “contacts” are specified for particular 
subject areas, such as, in the case of contracts, the “place of contracting”, 
“place of performance”, and location of the parties.70 Given this diversity 
of considerations, there seems little cause for confidence that the Second 
Restatement is (or aspires to be) a useful tool to predict the outcome of 
individual cases, or that it strongly advances consistent decision making in 
choice of law problems. In effect, if not in intention, the variety of 
theoretical positions seemingly combined in the Second Restatement has 
had the effect of expanding the degree of judicial discretion in choice of 
law problems, consistent with the aspirations (if not the methodologies) of 
most U.S. choice of law revolutionaries. 
III. THE EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVOLUTION 
Prior to the emergence of unified European rules, private international 
law had become a matter of fairly diverse national regulation in the various 
European states – the product of increased dissonance in the debate about 
which connecting factors should be relied upon to “localize” a legal 
relationship.71 Savigny’s vision of a uniform system of private international 
law was thus largely sidelined by the reality of disparate national traditions 
– only partially countered by the harmonizing influence of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, an institutional embodiment and 
direct inheritor of the internationalist tradition in private international law.72 
In the diverse European legal systems, private international law – while 
retaining a sense of its traditional internationalist aspirations – was 
increasingly adapted to serve domestic policies, partly influenced by U.S. 
 
 67. Id. at § 187(2)(b). 
 68. Id. at § 188. 
 69. Id. at § 6. 
 70. Id. at § 188(2). 
 71. See supra Part I.A. 
 72. See, e.g., Geert De Baere & Alex Mills, T.M.C. Asser and Public and Private International 
Law: The Life and Legacy of “a Practical Legal Statesman,” NETH. YEARBOOK INT’L L., Dec. 2011, at 
3, 28. 
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theoretical developments, but less so by US techniques.73 
Under the common law, the theoretical baggage of Dicey’s vested 
rights theory had been largely cast off, in favor of a pragmatism which 
involved loosening rather than entirely abandoning old choice of law 
techniques, but which placed greater emphasis on finding the most 
appropriate solution for each individual case.74 Private international law 
was thus, in the common law tradition, considered to be focused on 
achieving justice and fairness in individual cases, although with little 
analysis of what these criteria might mean when more than one legal order 
is potentially applicable, and while remaining blind to the substance of the 
possible governing laws.75 
Within the European Union, the conception and function of private 
international law has, however, been transformed over recent years.76 
Instead of being viewed as national law, serving national policy interests, 
private international law has developed a new identity as part of the process 
of defining the European legal order and facilitating the efficient 
functioning of the internal market. In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam gave 
the institutions of the European Union a new competence in the field of 
private international law.77 As amended and renumbered by the Lisbon 
Treaty (2009), Article 81(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (previously the Treaty on the European Community) now 
provides (in part) that: 
 
the European Parliament and the Council . . . shall adopt measures, 
 
 73. See, e.g., Michaels, The New European Choice of Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 1616. 
 74. JAMES FAWCETT &  JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, CHESHIRE, NORTH AND FAWCETT: PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (14th ed. 2008) (“There is no sacred principle that pervades all decisions, but 
when the circumstances indicate that the internal law of a foreign country will provide a solution more 
just, more convenient and more in accord with the expectations of the parties than the internal law of 
England, the English judge does not hesitate to give effect to the foreign rules. What particular foreign 
law shall be chosen depends on different considerations in each legal category. Neither justice nor 
convenience is promoted by rigid adherence to any one principle. . . . Private international law is no 
more an exact science than is any other part of the law of England; it is not scientifically founded on the 
reasoning of jurists, but it is beaten out on the anvil of experience.”). 
 75. See e.g., MILLS, supra note 2, at 3. 
 76. See Mills, Federalism in the European Union and the United States, supra note 63, at 399-
400. 
 77. See generally Andrew Dickinson, European Private International Law: Embracing New 
Horizons or Mourning the Past?, 1 J.  PRIVATE INT’L L. 197 (2005); Katharina Boele-Woelki & Ronald 
H. van Ooik, The Communitarization of Private International Law, 4 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INT’L 
LAW 1 (2002); Oliver Remien, European Private International Law, the European Community and its 
Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 53, 60 (2001); Jurgen 
Basedow, The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam, 37 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 687 (2000). 
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particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market, aimed at ensuring: 
(a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of 
judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases; [and] 
. . . . 
(c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States 
concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction78 
 
This enhanced regulatory capability has received expression in an 
active legislative program which sees private international law developing 
an increasingly prominent role in the European legal system.79 The 
Brussels I Regulation (2001)80 has been followed by the Brussels II 
Regulation (2003),81 Rome I Regulation (2008),82 and Rome II Regulation 
(2007).83 A new Rome III Regulation has recently been adopted and come 
into effect from June 2012 in certain Member States (under enhanced 
cooperation rules),84 dealing with choice of law in divorce and legal 
separation. A proposal for a Regulation on succession and wills85 was 
presented in 2009, and two further proposals for Regulations on 
matrimonial property86 and the property consequences of registered 
partnerships87 were presented in March 2011. 
 
 78. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 81(2) Mar. 
30, 2010, 2010 OJ (C 83) 47. 
 79. See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Crawford & Janeen M. Carruthers, Conflict of Loyalties in the Conflict 
of Laws: The Cause, The Means and the Cost of Harmonisation, JURID. REV. 251 (2005); Boele-Woelki 
& van Ooik, supra note 78; Peter North, Private International Law: Change or Decay?, 50 INT’L 
COMP. L.Q. 477 (2001). 
 80. See supra note 9. 
 81. Council Regulation 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility (EC), repealing Regulation 1347/2000, EU OJ L 338, 23 December 2003 (EC). 
 82. See supra note 11. 
 83. Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the 
Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199). 
 84. Council Regulation 1259/2010, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Law 
Applicable to Divorce and Legal Separation (Rome III), 2010 O.J. (L 343) 10, 16. 
 85. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions and Authentic Instruments in 
Matters of Succession and the Creation of a European Certificate of Succession, COM (2009) 154 final 
(Oct. 14, 2009). 
 86. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions in Matters of Matrimonial Property Regimes, COM (2011) 
126 final (Mar. 16, 2011). 
 87. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Regarding the Property Consequences of Registered 
Partnerships, COM (2011) 127 final (Mar. 16, 2011). 
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The significance of this European regulation is that it has effected a 
transformation not only in the source of rules of private international law – 
from national law to European law – but a transformation in their character 
and function. Within the European Union, private international law rules 
are viewed as serving a systemic or public ordering function, allocating 
regulatory authority between Member States in the service of “the proper 
functioning of the internal market”. The transformation of private 
international law – the ‘paradigm shift’ – has thus come once again in 
response to an external critique of the subject. Private international law was 
examined from the point of view of the needs of the European internal 
market, and found wanting. The diversity of private international law rules 
was found to be an obstacle to the efficient functioning of the market, and 
national rules (and the national policies they inherently reflected) were cast 
aside. This was, therefore, not a theoretical revolution from the inside, led 
by private international lawyers, but a practical revolution led by European 
actors focused on economic considerations – with the theory coming 
largely ex post facto in an effort to understand the transformations which 
are occurring or have already occurred. 
To some extent, the EU revolution may be considered a rediscovery of 
the original function of rules of private international law, albeit newly 
adapted to the service of particular regulatory objectives – the EU 
revolution has (re)conceived of private international law rules as concerned 
with the appropriate allocation of regulatory authority, distantly echoing 
Savigny. Although these ideas have been transplanted to a federal context, 
they have nevertheless provided an important renewal of private 
international law’s traditional public dimension, and given the subject fresh 
prominence and academic interest in the European Union. This is perhaps 
particularly notable with respect to the revival in significance and stature of 
the traditional objective of avoiding conflicts between legal orders. Strict 
rules of lis pendens and judgment recognition in the Brussels I Regulation 
strive to achieve this by reducing instances of overlapping jurisdiction 
between Member States, based on the argument that “In the interests of the 
harmonious administration of justice it is necessary to minimize the 
possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable 
judgments will not be given in two Member States.”88 The harmonisation 
of choice of law similarly aims to ensure decisional consistency, based on 
the argument that “The proper functioning of the internal market creates a 
need, in order to improve the predictability of the outcome of litigation, 
certainty as to the law applicable and the free movement of judgments, for 
 
 88. Brussels I Regulation (2001), supra note 9, Recital 15. 
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the conflict-of-law rules in the Member States to designate the same 
national law irrespective of the country of the court in which an action is 
brought.”89 These traditional objectives of private international law are, 
however, reconceived as means to a ‘greater’ end – the principal objective 
of improving the efficient functioning of the European internal market. 
IV. LEARNING FROM THE U.S. AND EU EXPERIENCES 
The analysis above has highlighted four strikingly different models of 
private international law, and four different ways of thinking about its 
function and purpose. First, the idea of private international law as 
concerned with the international allocation of state power (which we might 
associate with Savigny). Second, the idea of private international law as 
concerned with the national recognition of private rights (which we might 
associate with Dicey and Beale). Third, the idea of private international law 
as a question of identifying and pursuing state policy interests (which we 
might associate with the US choice of law revolution). And fourth, the idea 
of private international law as aiming to increase the efficiency of the 
functioning of the European internal market (which we might associate 
with the EU private international law revolution). 
The following are some critical reflections on what we might learn 
from the experiences of the U.S. and EU revolutions in private international 
law. The final section then offers some concluding thoughts as to how 
private international law might be conceived or reconceived in light of the 
analysis in this article. 
A. The U.S. experience 
It is easy to see why U.S. scholars reacted against the artificial 
formalism of the vested rights approach. Savigny’s criticism of the 
approach – that it is circular, because it is private international law rules 
which determine when rights arise – has a great deal of bite, at least once 
ideas of ‘natural rights’ are dismissed.90 The strict territorialism which 
underpinned Huber’s commitment to vested rights was also increasingly 
untenable by the early nineteenth century, when it was already clear that 
states were asserting regulatory authority extraterritorially in a range of 
circumstances.91 Since private international law rules were not serving their 
purported function of mechanically recognizing private rights, but were 
 
 89. Rome I Regulation (2008), supra note 11, Recital 6; and (identically) Rome II Regulation 
(2007), supra note 83, Recital 21. 
 90. See, e.g., Mills (2009), supra note 2, at 57-58. 
 91. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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rather determining when such rights should be said to have arisen, judges 
were in reality navigating blindly with no policy direction from the 
theoretical fictions which purported to guide them.92 US revolutionary 
scholars sought to uncover the ‘real’ policies and decisions operating 
behind or through private international law rules, and argued that the rules 
ought to openly reflect those practices.93 The U.S. revolution was of critical 
importance in drawing attention to the fact that private international law 
rules are not mechanical or neutral, but themselves engage with a variety of 
policy considerations. Private international law would be – and indeed was 
– much poorer without these insights. 
It is less certain whether the variety of approaches introduced by US 
private international law scholars have represented clear progress in filling 
this policy void – the limited international influence of the US revolution 
might suggest otherwise. A range of difficulties might be tentatively 
highlighted.94 There seems to be a tendency in much US scholarship to 
subsume private international law questions within other considerations. 
There is indeed something perhaps inevitably destructive in the idea, 
central to the legal realist critique, that private international law theory 
should follow private international law practice (and not the other way 
round),95 as this leaves practice to be shaped by externally defined 
considerations. It is difficult to avoid the impression that at least some 
choice of law scholarship has theorized itself into the margins, achieving 
only a form of self-obsolescence. Perhaps this is indeed reflected in the (at 
least perceived) decline of private international law as an object of 
academic study in the United States, flying otherwise paradoxically in the 
face of its ever-increasing practical importance. 
Some strains of government interest analysis, for instance, require the 
court to do nothing more than interpret potentially applicable state statutes, 
and in case more than one purports to govern the dispute or relationship, 
apply the law of the forum.96 From this perspective, however, choice of law 
almost seems to disappear as an independent process or consideration, 
supposedly swallowed by statutory interpretation and by subservience to 
legislative policies. But such an approach may itself be highly artificial and 
unpredictable as legislators are seldom cognizant, let alone expressly clear, 
as to whether the rules they are adopting will apply to international cases 
 
 92. See Wardhaugh, supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 94. See, e.g., Juenger (1984), supra note 62. 
 95. See supra note 43 . 
 96. See supra note 58. 
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(or as to what exact policies they are trying to advance).97 In addition, there 
are difficulties in adapting this approach to cases governed by the common 
law, in which there is no legislative intention to divine. This approach may 
also be highly unsatisfactory, as it reduces choice of law to mere assertions 
of interest – in the absence of any underlying criteria for when an assertion 
of interest is ‘legitimate’, which begs a raft of questions. The focus on 
asserted interests also implicitly discards the important possibility that 
other states may have an interest in or policy in favor of non-regulation. It 
may further over-emphasize the role of private international law in the 
resolution of particular disputes, and under-emphasize the role private 
international law plays in guiding the behavior of international actors, 
many of whom might favor certainty of any kind over open-textured rules 
which seek to advance indeterminate state policy interests. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see what role it leaves for the expectations and agreements of 
private parties. In addition, it may further ignore or underplay interests 
which states may have beyond their legislative assertions, such as interests 
in harmonious co-existence with other states, in the avoidance of 
duplicative or inefficient litigation98, or in the forms of international 
cooperation which take place through the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law in response to concrete practical problems, such as cross-
border adoption99 or child abduction.100 
Finally, the favoring of the law of the forum either expressly or 
implicitly adopted in many such approaches seems to make choice of law a 
secondary consideration to jurisdiction – under this approach it may be 
jurisdictional rules which effectively determine the applicable law. But this 
again neglects the particular policy considerations at stake in choice of law 
rules in favor of the different considerations at play in determining 
 
 97. See generally  Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. 
REV. 392 (1980). It should also be pointed out that where questions do clearly arise concerning the 
intended scope of potentially applicable statutes, traditional choice of law methodology does not 
preclude that determination through statutory interpretation as a second stage of the choice of law 
process – once the governing legal order has been determined, a further inquiry may indeed be required 
into which specific laws of that order apply. This does not, however, render the first stage (the 
determination of the applicable legal order through choice of law rules) redundant, except to the extent 
that it is overridden through ‘mandatory’ rules. See generally Trevor C. Hartley, Mandatory Rules in 
International Contracts: The Common Law Approach, in 266 RECUEIL DES COURS 337 (1997). 337. 
 98. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor 
Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (1960). 
 99. See generally, Intercountry Adoption Section of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=45 (last visited Apr. 5, 
2013). 
 100. See generally Child Abduction Section of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=21 (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
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jurisdiction – which may be based, for example, on general contacts 
between the defendant and the forum rather than any connection between 
the subject matter of the dispute and the forum.101 
In short, such approaches – under which private international law is 
seen to serve other domestic policies – seem inevitably to neglect the 
specific issues raised by cross-border private disputes and the insights 
which private international law and particularly choice of law might have 
to offer. In this view of private international law, there is little room left for 
considerations of the appropriate allocation of state power, or the avoidance 
of conflicting regulation. The experience of the Second Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws has given rise to other, similar concerns. It has been 
argued that by “[t]rying to be all things to all people, it produced mush”.102 
More particularly, the Second Restatement approach is open to the 
criticism that by including too many ‘choice-influencing considerations’103 
and being too open-textured, it effectively defers any decisions to 
individual judges in individual cases, leaving little room for the 
development of broad and coherent policies. By individualizing choice of 
law decisions under rules which do little to constrain discretionary 
decision-making, such an approach once again seems to deny private 
international law its own policy impact – in being open to everything, it 
strives for nothing. 
B. The EU experience 
It is, once again, not difficult to understand the perspective of the 
instigators of European private international law reforms. Viewed from the 
point of view of the interests of the internal market, the range of 
inconsistent private international law regulations which were present in the 
various Member States prior to European reforms clearly appears as an 
obstacle or obstruction to the smooth functioning of the market. European 
harmonization of private international law is an obvious response to this 
problem, at least in the absence of the more legally and politically 
challenging and contentious project of the harmonization of European 
private law.104 While such harmonization projects always present 
difficulties in terms of the potential for inconsistent national interpretations 
of the rules, the European Court of Justice has gradually been, and will 
 
 101. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 102. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 253 (1992). 
 103. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
267 (1966). 
 104. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 63. 
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continue to be, able to offer definitive guidance on disputed provisions. As 
further practical harmonization is achieved, private international law in the 
European Union is moving ever closer to at least some of the traditional 
aspirations associated in this article with Savigny. Rules of private 
international law will increasingly effect an ordering of private law 
regulatory authority between the various Member States, aiming to 
minimize the potential for jurisdictional conflicts by ensuring that only one 
Member State takes jurisdiction over a dispute (through harmonized rules 
on jurisdiction and lis pendens), that wherever a dispute is litigated the 
same law will be applied (through harmonized choice of law rules), and 
that the resolution of a dispute in one Member State will almost always 
preclude the re-litigation of that dispute in another Member State (through 
rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments). 
There are, however, a number of problems which have arisen in 
practice with the development of European private international law 
regulation. One is a consequence of the fact that this regulation is focused 
on achieving federal rather than international objectives. The Brussels I 
Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments105 has faced particular difficulties concerning its scope of 
application. The terms of the Regulation determine its applicability 
principally on the basis of the domicile of the defendant in any civil or 
commercial litigation – potentially encompassing claims against EU 
domiciled defendants which are otherwise entirely unconnected with the 
internal market. However, the rules of the Regulation are drafted only with 
internal market problems in mind – giving no consideration, for example, 
to the effect of jurisdiction agreements in favor of non-Member States, 
subject matter connections with non-Member States, or prior proceedings 
in non-Member States.106 The practical impact of this limitation is that the 
allocation of regulatory competence to Member States may not sufficiently 
take into consideration the connections between a dispute and non-Member 
States. The Regulation may thus end up allocating regulatory authority 
inappropriately, and actually facilitate more conflicts between Member 
State and non-Member State legal orders. The general problem with the 
Brussels I Regulation is a failure for its rules to match up to its scope (both 
as interpreted by the European Court of Justice) – its scope encompasses a 
variety of non-internal market questions, but its rules are motivated only by 
 
 105. Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J. (L 12). 
 106. This well-known problem is highlighted by the ECJ decision in Owusu v. Jackson [2005] ILPr 
25, [2005] ECR I-553; see, e.g., Richard Fentiman, Choice of Law in Europe: Uniformity and 
Integration, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2021, 2041 (2008). 
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internal market considerations, with limited recognition of their 
‘externalities’. 
Further related problems also arise from the influence of the internal 
market on the design of European rules of private international law. One 
impact is that European rules have tended to be more rigid, aimed at 
achieving certainty and predictability for market participants, rather than 
necessarily at achieving appropriate outcomes.107 From a common law 
perspective, having moved away from the rigid rules previously adopted 
under the motivation of Dicey’s vested rights approach, this change has 
appeared regressive.108 In some cases, the selection of rule has also itself 
been problematic. In the Rome Convention and now Rome I Regulation, 
for instance, the law applicable to a contract in the absence of party choice 
is (rebuttably) presumed to be the law of the location (variously defined) of 
the characteristic performer of the contract.109 In many cases it is difficult 
to see much sense behind this choice – why one party’s home law ought to 
govern a relationship which is centered elsewhere, around the place of 
performance of the contract. This is a concern which has arguably led 
English courts (historically more used to applying territorial choice of law 
rules, including under the influence of vested rights, which also led to a 
territorial influence in applying the later “proper law of the contract” 
approach110) to a greater willingness to overcome the presumption 
compared with the courts of other Member States.111 The presumption has 
the benefit of at least appearing more certain and predictable, particularly 
where contractual performance crosses borders, but this ‘internal market’ 
objective is not a value traditionally protected in private international law 
rules which have historically been more focused on ensuring the 
appropriate allocation of regulatory authority. 
Similarly, in the context of jurisdiction the Brussels I Regulation has 
been interpreted to mean that considerations of lis pendens – motivated by 
 
 107. This is of course a question of balancing rather than absolutes – for example, Recital 16 to the 
Rome I Regulation, supra note 11, provides that “[t]o contribute to the general objective of this 
Regulation, legal certainty in the European judicial area, the conflict-of law rules should be highly 
foreseeable,” but immediately acknowledges that “[t]he courts should, however, retain a degree of 
discretion to determine the law that is most closely connected to the situation.” 
 108. See, e.g., Fentiman, supra note 106. 
 109. Rome I Regulation, supra note 11, Article 4(1) and 4(2), in conjunction with Article 19. 
 110. See Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v. Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] A.C. 50 (H.L.), 62 (stressing  
the general importance of the ‘lex loci solutionis’ (law of the place of performance) in identifying the 
system of law governing a contract, although noting that the importance of this factor “varies with the 
nature of the contract”); see also, Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Oil Co [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1136, 1150. 
 111. See, e.g., Jonathan Hill, Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: The 
Approach of the UK Courts, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325 (2004). 
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avoiding potentially conflicting parallel proceedings in different Member 
States – outweigh the need to give practical effect to jurisdiction112 or 
arbitration113 agreements. Thus, a court of an EU Member State second 
seized of a dispute, even if it believes there is an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement in its favor, is obliged to stay its proceedings in favor of the 
Member State court first seized, clearing the way for ‘strategic’ (even bad 
faith) litigation tactics – the infamous “Italian torpedo.”114 
It is true that these problems are being (partially) addressed under 
recently agreed reforms.115 They nevertheless highlight a problematic 
prioritization of the avoidance of possible conflicts of laws – a ‘secondary’ 
objective of traditional private international law – over its ‘primary’ 
objective of appropriately allocating regulatory authority between states. 
The lack of concern over appropriateness is almost reminiscent of Currie’s 
(seemingly half-joking) suggestion that, since “[a]ll that is required . . .  is a 
way of determining, simply and certainly, what law will be applied, so that 
transactions can be planned and litigation undertaken with some confidence 
as to the outcome – and, in addition, assurance that the decision will not 
vary according to the forum . . . a nearly ideal choice-of-law rule . . . would 
be that the governing law shall be that of the State first in alphabetical 
order.”116 In the unlikely event a common language could be agreed upon, 
such a rule would no doubt achieve a level of certainty and predictability in 
choice of law between EU Member States, but at the cost of a principled or 
appropriate allocation of regulatory authority. 
In summary, the various criticisms leveled at European regulation of 
private international law tend to circle around the idea that it has favored 
certainty and predictability over appropriateness – both in terms of 
applying relatively rigid rules which preclude fact-sensitive decisions, and 
in terms of the questionable appropriateness of some of the rules chosen. In 
general, it seems that at least to some extent a traditional policy objective 
of private international law – the appropriate allocation or division of 
regulatory authority – has been partially sidelined by other policy 
objectives, in particular the efficiency of the internal market. This is, of 
 
 112. Gasser v. MISAT, [2003] E.C.R. I-14693. 
 113. Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, [2009] E.C.R. I-663. 
 114. Mario Franzosi, Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 382 (1997); see also, Trevor C. Hartley, The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of 
the Common Law of Conflict of Laws, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q 813, 815 (2005). 
 115. See Council Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), O.J. (L 351). 
 116. Brainerd Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 258, 279 (1961). 
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course, a question of degree – EU private international law has not adopted 
arbitrary choice of law rules, and in some cases specialized choice of law 
rules have been designed with other regulatory goals in mind,117 
particularly when it comes to the protection of weaker parties, like 
consumers118 and employees,119 and the protection of the environment.120 
But in general the critics of EU private international law rules have 
highlighted what is perceived as an excessive focus on the interests of the 
internal market over other policy objectives which ought to be taken into 
consideration, including the traditional interests of private international law 
in regulating the allocation of competence between states, not limited to 
EU Member States. 
V. SO WHAT IS (OR SHOULD BE) THE IDENTITY OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
It should be apparent from the analysis in this article that there is a 
considerable range of different ideas of what private international law “is” 
in the sense of how we should understand its purpose and function. Under 
different theoretical and practical perspectives, private international law has 
been considered as international or at least natural law, federal law, 
regional law, or local law. It has been considered as serving the public 
functions of ordering authority between states or pursuing state-defined 
legislative policy interests, or as serving the private functions of giving 
effect to party expectations or protecting private rights acquired under 
foreign law. Clearly more than one answer might be given to the question 
of private international law’s “true” character. Private international law is, 
to some extent, what we choose it to be, and this choice reflects (or ought 
to reflect) the values we have which we think it might serve to promote. 
For this author at least, one such fundamental value is what I have referred 
to elsewhere as “justice pluralism”121 – the acceptance that the questions of 
private law do not have a single ‘correct’ answer, that different societies are 
capable of making (and entitled to make) different decisions about such 
questions, and that in a world of coexisting states those differentiated 
determinations of the just outcome of a dispute ought to be given at least a 
degree of accommodation. This value is by no means the only value which 
might underpin a theory of private international law, and it is of course not 
 
 117. See, e.g., Ulla Liukkunen, Managing Legal Diversity in the EU: The Case of Subject-Specific 
Conflicts Rules, 20 Eur. Rev. Priv. Law 1045 (2012). 
 118. Rome I Regulation , supra note 11, at Article 6. 
 119. Rome I Regulation, supra note 11, at Article 8. 
 120. Rome II Regulation, supra note 83, at Article 7. 
 121. See Mills, supra note 2, at Chapter 1. 
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enough on its own (it does not tell us how or when that accommodation 
should be provided – itself at least partly a question of “justice” in the 
distribution of regulatory power),122 but a choice of this or some other value 
frames our perspective on private international law in foundational ways. 
Advocating for a particular ‘identity’ for private international law may 
therefore ultimately best be characterized less as a contest of legal 
arguments or traditions, and more as a choice between competing values. 
Perhaps the ostensible stagnation in private international law theory may at 
least be partially attributed to the philosophical depth of the problems it 
invites us to confront. 
At the same time, however, in the face of seemingly ever-increasing 
globalization, the practical significance of private international law has 
never been greater. Perhaps, then, there is some cause for hope that the 
subject might receive renewed attention,123 and that through this the 
traditional values of private international law, seemingly neglected in both 
the United States and European Union, might be given renewed 
consideration. This is not to advocate a luddite response to the machinery 
of modern techniques. Indeed, it may be observed that each approach to 
private international law analyzed in this article seems to have something to 
offer in developing a full understanding of private international law’s 
actual and potential identity, in both positive and negative terms. We might 
admire Savigny’s idealistic internationalism and value his analysis of the 
traditional policy objectives of private international law in allocating 
regulatory authority and avoiding conflicting regulation – but his 
dependence on natural law foundations which obscure the policy decisions 
and practical difficulties inherent in the design and negotiation of particular 
private international law rules seems anachronistic. From Dicey, we might 
recognize the necessity of an attentiveness to private party interests – but it 
is difficult to see much in favor of his circular dependence on an equally 
outmoded theory of vested rights. Looking at the U.S. choice of law 
revolution, we might learn from the greater focus placed on the policy 
choices inherent in private international law – but be wary of the 
overshadowing of private international law’s own traditional policy goals 
and interests, including the neglect of its systemic objectives. And finally, 
 
 122. Id. at 23, 303. 
 123. Although as a note of pessimism, each era of private international law seems to characterize 
itself as a period of unprecedented globalization under which the subject demands urgent attention – 
Joseph Story, for instance, noted in the Preface to his 1834 Commentary on the Conflict of Laws that 
“[t]he subject is one of great importance and interest; and from the increasing intercourse between 
foreign States, as well as between the different States of the American Union, it is daily brought home 
more and more to the ordinary business and pursuits of human life.” 
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from the EU revolution in private international law, we might welcome the 
revival of the traditional public systemic perspective on private 
international law – but be less enthusiastic about the narrow and at times 
formalist conception of private international law’s function and effect 
which is the product of the centrality of the internal market in the 
development of EU private international law. 
So where might this all leave us? I would argue that the identity, 
special significance and potential ‘unique selling point’ of private 
international law can best be understood through a public perspective – 
something which the U.S. and EU revolutions have in common – but one 
which should not neglect (or construe narrowly) its policy dimensions or 
real world effects. This does not mean a nostalgic return to the abstract 
idealist traditions of Savigny’s private international law – but it does mean 
not losing sight of the values and objectives which private international law 
has traditionally sought to promote. Recognizing this identity of private 
international law means seeing it as a form of “secondary law” (in H.L.A. 
Hart’s sense)124 which serves the international, federal or regional function 
of ordering the distribution of regulatory authority between legal orders, 
accepting and reinforcing their pluralism. The interaction between these 
different levels of governance in private international law may itself give 
rise to complications, which have been insufficiently appreciated in the 
development of at least EU rules, but this does not render them 
incommensurable.125 At each level, by imposing ‘architectural’ order on the 
allocation of regulatory authority between systems, private international 
law acts ‘publicly’ (although largely without a public institutional 
hierarchy126) to coordinate and preserve the diversity of those legal orders. 
In so doing, it serves its own traditional policy purposes (regrettably 
marginalized in different ways under both US and EU developments), as 
well as potentially interacting in various ways with the substantive policy 
purposes underlying different private law legal orders, by prioritizing 
certain parties or interests. 
Private international law is thus not only important for what it does, 
but for how it does it: the way in which, for instance, it defines the contours 
of potentially applicable legal systems, and balances the interests of 
claimants against those of defendants, at the same time as balancing the 
 
 124. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (2d ed. 1994); see MILLS, supra note 2, at 19. 
 125. See Alex Mills, Variable Geometry, Peer Governance, and the Public International 
Perspective on Private International Law, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
(Diego P. Fernández Arroyo & Horatia Muir Watt eds., forthcoming 2014). 
 126. See id. for further discussion of this issue, and of the potential role of the idea of “peer 
governance” in explaining the international systemic functioning of private international law. 
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interests of private parties against the individual and collective interests of 
states, grappling in its own way with what is perhaps the central issue 
facing the international legal order as a whole. An important part of the 
idea and identity of private international law which emerges from this 
analysis is that it should therefore not just be viewed as a set of rules for 
solving disputes. As a regulatory technique for coordinating diversity and 
for managing and supporting pluralism, it can and should be part of the 
legal response to the practical problems of our globalized world, alongside 
and in partnership with the universalist techniques and aspirations of public 
international law. 
 
